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Security of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution is addressed and a security analysis frame-
work, which does not rely on phase-space symmetries of signal states and correlations, is developed. In a
general purification-based approach, following optimality of Gaussian collective attacks, it is suggested to find
an equivalent generally mixed two-mode state shared between the trusted parties and then purifying it using
Bloch-Messiah decomposition. This allows to assess security of the schemes with arbitrary parameters, which
can be typically expected in experiments. It also allows to theoretically predict the role of asymmetries of sig-
nals and correlations on security of the protocols. The method can be used for security analysis of practical
continuous-variable schemes directly from the measured data without any symmetrization assumptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD)
(see [1] for review) is aimed at efficient realization of quantum
cryptography using off-the-shelf optical communication com-
ponents. Security of CV QKD was established against indi-
vidual, collective and general attacks in an asymptotic as well
as finite-size regime for some protocols [2]. Realization of
CV QKD is typically performed using prepare-and-measure
schemes, when an optimized Gaussian quadrature modulation
is applied to coherent or squeezed signal states [3, 4]. The
core of security analysis of Gaussian CV QKD is evaluation
of Holevo bound, which upper limits eavesdropper’s infor-
mation, and follows optimality of collective Gaussian attacks
[5, 6]. In a general case of lossy and noisy quantum chan-
nel an eavesdropper Eve is assumed to be able to purify all
the noise related to the channel. This allows evaluating the
Holevo bound from the entropies of the state, which is shared
between the trusted parties, namely Alice and Bob. In order to
distinguish between trusted (related to Alice’s and Bob’s de-
vice imperfections such as noise of the signal, modulator and
detectors) and untrusted noise (related to the untrusted quan-
tum channel), the state shared between Alice and Bob must
be theoretically purified [7]. Then all the additional impuri-
ties can be attributed to the channel and contribute to Eve’s
information. State preparation is typically purified using an
equivalent two-mode pure entangled state [8]. However, such
approach supposes symmetries of modulated states and cor-
relations in the phase space and, in case of squeezed states,
fixes the modulation variance to the level of signal squeezing
(the latter limitation can be removed by generalized pure-state
preparation schemes [9, 10], which are still limited by the two-
mode state purity). Moreover, trusted noise in this case should
be still added to the equivalent pure state using coupling to an-
other pure entangled two-mode state [11], which can be also
approximately lossless [12]. In order to overcome the limi-
tations and avoid approximations, we develop a generalized
approach to security analysis of CV QKD, which is based on
construction of an equivalent generally mixed two-mode state
from the actually measured variances and correlations in each
of the quadratures, and then purification of the obtained state
applying Bloch-Messiah reduction to CV states [13]. This
allows to assess security of practical CV QKD schemes and
study the role of asymmetries.
II. GENERALIZED PURIFICATION SCHEME
After the preparation and measurement, trusted parties
in CV QKD perform channel estimation (in the finite-size
regime of limited data ensembles it leads to confidence in-
tervals on the estimated parameters depending on the accept-
able probability of failure [14] and can be optimized [15],
which we however omit here, focusing on the asymptotic se-
curity, that can then be directly extended to finite-size regime
using existing techniques). Knowing channel transmittance
and excess noise, the trusted parties can reconstruct the state
(quadrature variances) prior to the channel as well as corre-
lations between the data. We assume that the reconstructed
variances of the modulated signal entering the channel are
V
(x,p)
B in each of the complementary quadratures (namely
x = a† + a, p = i(a† − a), expressed in terms of the quan-
tum operators of a given mode), Alice possesses modulation
data with variance V (x,p)M and the respective correlations gen-
erally are C(x,p)MB (note that typically C
(x,p)
MB = V
(x,p)
M , but a
more general situation can be foreseen, also state monitoring
after the modulation by a tap-off or optical switching may be
needed). We build an equivalent two-mode state of the form
γAB =

V
(x)
A 0 C
(x)
AB 0
0 V
(p)
A 0 C
(p)
AB
C
(x)
AB 0 V
(x)
B 0
0 C
(p)
AB 0 V
(p)
B
 , (1)
which should i) contain the same mode (B), described by
V
(x,p)
B , as was propagating through the channel, so that the
entanglement-based and the prepare-and-measure preparation
schemes are indistinguishable for Eve, who observes the same
reduced state in the channel, and ii) result in the same signal
states conditioned by Alice’s measurement on her mode. For
the coherent-state protocol, which is equivalent to heterodyne
measurement of Alice’s mode of the two-mode state (1), the
latter condition leads to the simple ratio
C2M
VM
=
C2AB
VA + 1
, (2)
where we omitted quadrature upper-scripts for simplicity (i.e.,
the expression is the same in both quadratures), and which
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2leads to equivalence of the mutual information in prepare-
and-measure and entanglement-based schemes. However, this
keeps one of the parameters undefined and we therefore sym-
metrize the covariance matrix by putting VA = VB in both x
and p, hence arriving at the matrix
γAB =

V
(x)
B 0 C
(x)
MB
√
1+V
(x)
B
V
(x)
M
0
0 V
(p)
B 0 C
(p)
MB
√
1+V
(p)
B
V
(p)
M
C
(x)
MB
√
1+V
(x)
B
V
(x)
M
0 V
(x)
B 0
0 C
(p)
MB
√
1+V
(p)
B
V
(p)
M
0 V
(p)
B

, (3)
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FIG. 1. Four-mode purification scheme for an arbitrary two-mode
state in modes A,B using two two-mode squeezed vacuum states
(EPR) with variances V1,2, two single-mode squeezers (SQZ) with
squeezing parameters s1,2 and two variable couplers before and after
the squeezers with transmittance values T1,2. Auxiliary modes C,D
are kept in the purification, but are not accessible neither two the
trusted parties, nor to Eve. State of the modes A,B is exactly as
in the two-mode generally mixed state (3), equivalent to imperfect
prepare-and-measure scheme.
which satisfies the equivalence conditions and represents the
general state preparation prior to the channel. In the case,
when V (x)B = V
(p)
B ≡ V and C(x)MB = C(p)MB = V (x)M =
V
(p)
M = V − 1, state preparation is perfect and (3) turns into
one for the standard pure two-mode squeezed vacuum state.
However, it is not necessarily the case and generally for a ar-
bitrary set of parameters the state (3) is not pure and must be
purified to account for the trusted noise. This can be done
by applying Bloch-Messiah decomposition to CV states [13]
using an optical network as given in Fig. 1, which consists
of two two-mode entangled sources, two variable couplers
and two squeezers set so that modes A,B of the four modes
A,B,C,D will be produced exactly in the state given by (3).
The modes C,D are kept in the purification, but are not ac-
cessible neither two the trusted parties, nor to Eve. This ap-
proach was previously used in entanglement-based CV QKD
[16] to find purification of generally noisy two-mode entan-
gled states. In the case of the state (3), which consists of four
unknown parameters, the scheme in Fig. 1 can be simplified
by setting T1 = 1, T2 = 1/2. The parameters of the two-mode
state (3) are then related to the purification scheme through the
system of four equations
V
(x,p)
B =
1
2
(
e±s2V2 + e±s1V1
)
C
(x,p)
AB =
1
2
(
e±s2V2 − e±s1V1
)
.
(4)
The system can be solved analytically to find the parameters
of purification scheme in Fig. 1, and the physically valid so-
lution reads
V1 =
√(
V
(x)
B − C(x)AB
)(
V
(p)
B − C(p)AB
)
V2 =
√(
V
(x)
B + C
(x)
AB
)(
V
(p)
B + C
(p)
AB
)
s1 =
1
4
log
V
(p)
B − C(p)AB
V
(x)
B − C(x)AB
s2 =
1
4
log
V
(p)
B + C
(p)
AB
V
(x)
B + C
(x)
AB
(5)
Knowing these parameters, we can build the explicit four-
mode pure-state covariance matrix γABCD, containing γAB
(3) as a sub-matrix. Now mode A is accessible to Alice for
a heterodyne measurement, while the mode B travels through
a generally lossy and noisy channel (which makes the over-
all state in modes ABCD mixed), and is measured by Bob.
Then, in the purification-based approach, the von Neumann
(quantum) entropy S(E) of the state, which is available to Eve
for the collective measurement, will be S(E) = S(ABCD),
i.e., the same as entropy of the four-mode state shared between
Alice and Bob over the quantum channel. Similarly, the quan-
tum entropy of the state conditioned on the Bob’s measure-
ment (relevant in the robust reverse reconciliation scenario)
is S(E|B) = S(ACD|B) and the Holevo bound can be ob-
tained as χBE = S(ABCD)− S(ACD|B), calculated from
the covariance matrices of the respective states (see details on
Gaussian CV QKD security analysis using covariance matrix
formalism in [7]). On the other hand, the mutual information
between the trusted parties can be obtained directly from the
3measured data and established correlations as
I
(hom)
AB =
1
2
log
(
1 +
C
′2
MB
V ′BVM − C ′2MB
)
(6)
in whatever quadrature measured by the homodyne detection
on Bob’s side or as
I
(het)
AB =
1
2
log
[(
1 +
C
(x)′2
MB(
V
(x)′
B + 1
)
V
(x)
M − C(x)
′2
MB
)
×
×
(
1 +
C
(p)′2
MB(
V
(p)′
B + 1
)
V
(p)
M − C(p)
′2
MB
)]
(7)
for the heterodyne detection, where V (x,p)
′
B andC
(x,p)′
MB are the
measured parameters after the channel influence, the bases of
the logarithms to be defined by the used encoding (e.g. nats
for base e or bits for base 2). This provides all the ingredi-
ents needed to evaluate the lower bound on secure key rate in
the case of collective attacks, which in the asymptotic regime
reads K = max{0, IAB − χBE}, where IAB is the mutual
information between Alice and Bob in either Bob’s measure-
ment scenario. The described method allows assessing secu-
rity of CV QKD with arbitrary and generally asymmetrical
signal states, correlations and modulation data, while taking
into account trusted imperfect preparation.
III. ROLE OF ASYMMETRIES
To illustrate applicability of the generalized security frame-
work, we use the above described methodology to study the
role of asymmetries in the coherent-state protocol, which
can be caused by generally phase-sensitive trusted prepara-
tion noise (previously only phase-insensitive preparation ex-
cess noise was studied in CV QKD [7, 12]). We address
coherent-state protocol with homodyne as well as with het-
erodyne detection (i.e., the non-switching protocol [17]) and
reverse reconciliation, realized over lossy and noisy channels,
and visualize the effect of symmetrical and asymmetrical state
preparation noise in Fig. 2 (note that we don’t take finite-
size effects, including imperfect post-processing, into account
here in order to clearly demonstrate the role of asymmetrical
trusted noise, the additional effects would just scale the depen-
dencies down). It is evident from the plots, that while phase-
sensitive preparation noise in the unmeasured quadrature does
not play role in the coherent-state protocol with the homodyne
detection, it does limit the key rate (and, respectively, the se-
curity distance of the protocol) when appears in the measured
one (here we assume, that complementary quadrature is mea-
sured only for the purposes of the full channel estimation) -
no matter, if the noise is symmetrical, or not. In the case of
heterodyne protocol, however, the phase-sensitive asymmetri-
cal preparation noise in either of the quadratures reduces the
key rate (or secure distance), while the phase-insensitive sym-
metrical preparation noise leads to further degradation of the
protocol.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
η,dB10-6
10-5
10-4
0.001
0.010
0.100
1
K
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
η,dB10-6
10-5
10-4
0.001
0.010
0.100
1
K
FIG. 2. Lower bound on secure key rate for coherent-state Gaussian
CV QKD versus channel attenuation η in dB scale for homodyne (up-
per panel) and heterodyne (lower panel) detection on the Bob’s side.
Modulation variance V (x,p)M = 9, correlation C
(x,p)
MB = ±9, Bob’s
state variance prior to channel V (x,p)B = 10 (perfect realization, solid
lines), V (x)B = 10, V
(p)
B = 10.1 (phase-sensitive preparation noise
0.1 SNU in p-quadrature, dashed lines), V (x)B = 10.1, V
(p)
B = 10
(phase-sensitive preparation noise 0.1 SNU in x-quadrature, dotted
lines), V (x,p)B = 10.1 (phase-insensitive preparation noise 0.1 SNU
in both quadratures, dot-dashed lines), channel noise related to the
channel input 7% SNU. Homodyne protocol is sensitive only to
preparation noise in the measured quadrature (solid and dashed lines
and dotted and dot-dashed lines overlap pairwise), heterodyne proto-
col is similarly degraded by phase-sensitive preparation noise (dot-
ted and dashed lines overlap) and is further undermined by phase-
insensitive preparation noise.
The above given examples show how the asymmetries in
the CV QKD protocol realizations should not be overlooked
in the practical situations and may also lead to tighter bounds
on Eve’s information.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed the generalized security analysis frame-
work for CV QKD, allowing to apply the most general
purification-based security analysis to an arbitrary protocol
with signals, modulation and correlations being asymmetrical
in the phase space. This allows evaluating security of the prac-
tical implementations of CV QKD using imperfect devices.
Our methodology can be also used to predict the performance
4of the protocols in the presence of asymmetries. The result
paves the way to practical implementation of CV QKD with
imperfect devices.
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